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Capitalist Development in Contemporary Southeast Asia:  
Neoliberalization, Elites, and Authoritarian Liberalism in the 
Philippines and Malaysia* 
 
Bonn Juegoβ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
There is something distinctive in the evolution of capitalism in Southeast Asia. This 
historical specificity of present-day capitalist moment concerns the differences in 
dynamics that the process of neoliberalization may have in different social contexts 
depending on the conflict-ridden interaction between local and transnational elite 
interests and on the contradictions between the political and economic imperatives of 
capital accumulation. Understanding the region’s complex structural relations and their 
attendant manifestations demands a dynamic analysis of processes, interests and 
transformations. 
 
This paper seeks to identify the specificities of capitalism in Southeast Asia 
focusing on the contrasting cases of the Philippines and Malaysia and explain the social 
transformations and struggles that brought it about, producing a particular social form 
with distinctive dynamics. To this end, it opens up three important areas of inquiry 
about post-1997 political-economic transformation and social change in the region. 
 
First, how has the process of neoliberalization evolved since 1997? Here the 
impetus given by the crises of 1997 and 2008 to the construction of new opportunities 
for economic restructuring and political reforms is called into question. Second, how 
and why class relations, specifically national and transnational elite interests, shape the 
evolution of capitalism in the region? This examines the role of domestic and 
transnational political-economic elites and the extent of their respective vested interests 
in shaping, negotiating, promoting, or resisting neoliberal reforms. And third, what 
particular social form (political-economic structure) is emergent in the region as a 
consequence of the interactions between the process of neoliberalization and the 
dynamics of elite interests? It also interrogates the how and why in the emergence of a 
seemingly contradictory social regime called ‘authoritarian liberalism’, which combines 
a strong state with liberal market economy, in the Philippines and Malaysia that results 
from conflicts in contemporary capitalist relations. 
 
Before addressing these interrelated phenomena, the next section sketches out an 
analytical framework through which post-1997 crisis evolution of capitalist 
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development in Southeast Asia, with particular reference to the cases of the Philippines 
and Malaysia, is examined, analyzed, and understood. A critical political economy 
framework of analysis is herein proposed—derived from a critique of mainstream 
approaches in politics and economics, and shaped by a synergy between classical 
Marxism, Coxian method of historical structure, and social conflict theory. It also 
presents a conceptual framework in which to understand the constitution of specific 
processes, interests, and forms in the system of capitalist development, particularly the 
interrelations of this paper’s working concepts: neoliberal reproduction, elite interests, 
and authoritarian liberalism.  
 
 
A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS ON THE SPECIFICITIES OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT1 
 
The paper combines the concepts and tools from various traditions in ‘critical political 
economy’ developed in and derived from the interrelated methodologies of classical 
Marxist political economy, Coxian method of historical structures in critical IPE, and 
social conflict theory in the political economy of Southeast Asia to produce a 
distinctive approach in understanding the specificities of capitalist development in 
developing countries. This alternative approach will prove useful in examining the 
interaction between neoliberal processes, social forces, and emergent social regimes at 
global, regional, and state/society levels. For the significance of these linkages to be 
grasped, the reductionist and ill-formulated mainstream approaches ranging from neo-
classical economics and neoliberal ideology to the established institutionalist 
approaches must be put aside. 
 
The critical political economy approach understands phenomena as ‘social 
relations’, in which ‘the political’ and ‘the economic’ are organically connected to, 
rather than separate from, one another. Through this approach, it can reveal the politics 
behind the economy. 
 
In sum, the critical political economy approach used here sees the structures, the 
relations, the processes, and the conflicts in understanding specific phenomena. A focus 
on structures allows for an analysis that situates phenomena within the broader context 
of the global and local dynamics of capitalism. An understanding of relations involved 
in specific phenomena allows for an inquiry into questions of power, interests, and 
ideology among the actors involved. An appreciation of processes—in which 
phenomena emerge and evolve—provides for a dynamic, not static, analysis of social 
change. And a perspective of conflicts understands the conflictual nature of structures, 
relations, and processes through which change is induced and produced. 
 
Combining the concepts and tools from the traditions of critical political economy 
creates an alternative approach viewed from comparative, critical, and interdisciplinary 
perspective. This approach thus captures ‘global - state - social change’ synergy and 
dynamics. At the same time, it is sensitive to specificities in national situations in 
particular historical moment in the context of social relations within a broadly 
comparative framework. 
 
                                                
1 An elaboration of the analytical framework—including a comprehensive review of literature on the 
political economy of Southeast Asia, the Philippines, and Malaysia—outlined here is in Chapter I of 
my PhD thesis (see Juego forthcoming). 
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Specificities of Capitalist Development in Southeast Asia: Processes, Interests, and 
Forms 
 
The method of analysis of this paper is to move from ideational abstractions to concrete 
historical processes through empirical evidence. At its most abstract, the conceptual 
framework for understanding the specificity of capitalist development outlines a 
simplified representation of a particular configuration of forces, namely: processes, 
interests, and forms. This is not to dispute that other factors or forces matter, but to 
illuminate the dynamism—rather than determinism or reductionism—of contemporary 
political economy in Southeast Asia so as to emphasize conflict, motion, and flux in 
capitalist development. 
 
As a heuristic device, three forces—which are either latent or manifest—interact in 
shaping capitalist development. In stylized format, the presentation proceeds as 
follows:  
 
Processes — Interests — Forms. 
 
It is necessary to understand neoliberalization as a ‘process’ to imply motion, flux, 
and the possibilities of change. Interests specifically refer to ‘vested interests’ of 
individuals or groups who have stakes for personal, class, ethnic, ideological, political, 
economic, or financial gains. And ‘form’ is a particular political-economic 
configuration. All these forces interact with each other in shaping the evolution of 
capitalism, and their interactions constitute a specific dynamic of capitalist relations. 
 
The relationships among these forces are neither mechanical nor predetermined 
hierarchically. Rather, causal relationship may be established depending on history and 
empirical study. Where relations between the forces are contingent, their specificity 
must always be an empirical question, that is one which must be answered by 
observing actual cases. 
 
However, as a critical research, the focus is more than on causality because it 
understands the dialectical relationship between these forces. The dialectics here is 
understood in three senses. First, all these forces exist together, not simply in causation 
but as interrelations within a system of interacting moments. That is to say, the three 
forces are an organic set of relations in which one cannot be separated from the other. 
Second, the dialectics deals with conflicts in the internal relations of a structure. As 
such, a phenomenon is approached in an open and fluid way, and hence it avoids 
mechanistic and reductionist interpretations of change. And third, against the broader 
reality in the overall structure, rival forces and different tendencies also exist. This 
means that there are other, alternative processes, interests, and forms interacting within 
the structure. 
 
The framework of this paper—centered on the dialectical relationship between the 
concepts ‘neoliberal reproduction’, ‘elite interests’, and ‘authoritarian liberalism’—is 
based broadly upon a critical comparative political economy approach that takes 
inspiration from classical Marxism, critical IPE, and social conflict theory and their 
applications to the circumstances of contemporary global capitalism (see Figure 1). Its 
critical orientation means that the purpose is not simply to conceptualize for the sake of 
conceptualization, but to explain the processes of historic transformation of capitalism 
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in Southeast Asia, the Philippines, and Malaysia. Its comparative approach suggests 
that there is a comparable dynamic at work that drives the general capitalist process to 
assume particular forms in specific contexts.  
 
 
Figure 1. 
Conceptual Framework: Specificity of Capitalist Development  
in Contemporary Southeast Asia 
 
NEOLIBERAL  
REPRODUCTION 
(Process) 
 
 
 
 
       ELITE            AUTHORITARIAN 
                    INTERESTS           LIBERALISM  
         (Interests)                                (Form) 
 
 
The question as to the reciprocity or to which direction the arrow of causality 
moves is a question of history. The present historical conjuncture is to be understood 
based on the most prevailing relationship among the several possible relationships that 
can be established in this heuristic device.  
 
On the question of the level of analysis, the focus of this paper is on the enduring 
hegemonic structure in Southeast Asia. In particular, neoliberalization is regarded here 
as the prevailing social process in Southeast Asia; elites as the dominant social force in 
capitalist relations; and authoritarian liberalism as the emergent social regime in the 
region. Of course, it acknowledges the existence of a counter-hegemonic structure and 
its potentials for social change. A much-detailed study on the dynamics within this 
counter-hegemonic structure is no doubt an important field of inquiry for another 
discussion. For instance, another worthwhile research endeavour may focus: on 
different social processes other than, or as an alternative to, neoliberalization; on 
labour, civil society, and social movements as potent social forces driving these 
processes; and the possibilities of a different social regime like democratic 
development that envisions both democracy and development as organically political 
and economic categories. The rationale for selecting the current focus is to show that 
even within the hegemonic structure itself, capitalist dynamics in the region and in 
respective countries is also conflictual. 
 
Just like other frameworks of analysis, the conceptual framework proposed here 
reflects precedence on what it deems to be (the most) significant impetus for the 
process of change. The paper does not make any claim that neoliberal reproduction is 
the only process in operation, that elites are the only actors at play, and that 
authoritarian liberalism is the only social form emerging in contemporary Southeast 
Asia. For sure there have been a plethora of research done in various contexts that 
focus on other actors, groups, agents, or identities that intervene in the processes of 
change and hence produced varying tendencies and social forms. It is simply to 
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articulate that it is implausible to understand existing dynamics of capital accumulation 
in the region without examining the conflictual relationship of these dominant forces. 
 
At this point, three key concepts used in this paper have to be operationalized: 
neoliberal reproduction, elite interests, and authoritarian liberalism. Each concept is 
already a phenomenon in itself in contemporary Southeast Asia. But an analysis of the 
interrelations of the three concepts and their mutually reinforcing tendencies is very 
significant in unpacking the complexity of the neoliberal phase of capitalist 
development in the contexts of enduring social relations in the Philippines and 
Malaysia. 
 
Neoliberal Reproduction 
 
The concept of ‘neoliberal reproduction’ refers to the prevailing political-economic 
process at this historical juncture. It is a concept of process by which contemporary 
capitalism evolves and reproduces its class and social relations, its means and resources 
of production, its political and economic institutions, as well as its structural 
contradictions and conflicts. Thus, the process entails the production of capitalist 
relations and the creation of social conditions for capital accumulation. 
 
There are two defining terms in this concept: neoliberalism and reproduction. 
Critical scholars have interpreted neoliberalism, inter alia, as a development discourse 
and strategy (Munck 1999), a new development doctrine (Cammack 2002), an 
ideological and class project (Harvey 2005), and a hegemonic paradigm (Cerny 2008). 
Amid these interpretations, there is agreement that neoliberalism is basically the 
contemporary configuration of capitalism that has de- and re-constructed capitalism in 
response to the 1970s crises. Based on this understanding, neoliberalism is essentially 
capitalism with the same drive for capital accumulation and the same exploitative 
relations of capital over labour. A critical conception of reproduction is related to a 
Marxist insight of ‘capitalist reproduction’ (see Weeks 1981; Jessop 1990; Himmelweit 
1991; Bonefeld 1993). Hence, reproduction is a process in which capitalism reproduces 
as it evolves its own relations (class and social relations), production (productive forces 
and resource allocation), exchange (money and finance), interests (bourgeois class 
interests), institutions (state, market and social institutions), and contradictions 
(structural contradictions and social conflicts). Within this conceptualization, it is 
implied that the survival and hegemony of neoliberalism ultimately depends on the 
reproduction of these material and ideological mechanisms of capitalism. At the same 
time, it suggests that the reproduction of capitalism’s inherent contradictions, as well as 
the conflicts these contradictions generate, signifies the precariousness of 
neoliberalism.     
 
But there is more to this process of neoliberalization than the reproduction of 
market-oriented policies and the institutional modifications associated with it. 
Reproduction does not mean that the process is not contested. In fact, the austerity and 
‘stabilization’ programmes imposed on the indebted Third World during the 
international debt crisis of the 1980s provoked massive protests from Turkey to Ghana 
to Mexico to Brazil to the Philippines that went on for years (Walton and Ragin 1990). 
Neoliberalization also comes with the reproduction of conflictual social relations 
between economic and political classes. This conflict has sprung from neoliberalism’s 
strategy to create or restore elitist and capitalist class power through what David 
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Harvey (2003, 2005) calls ‘accumulation by dispossession’ whereby private 
appropriation necessitates deprivation of peoples’ collective rights, access, or 
ownership. 
 
Neoliberal reproduction thus constitutes two organically-connected processes: [a] 
the reproduction of market-oriented policies and institutions, and [b] the reproduction 
of market-driven strategy of accumulation by dispossession. As such, there are 
opposing tendencies in this process of neoliberalization that entails, on the one hand, a 
convergence towards the reproduction of neoliberal institutions and policies, and on the 
other hand, the reproduction of social antagonisms that spring from this accumulation 
strategy through dispossession which deepens hierarchies, divisions, inequalities, and 
hence resistances. 
 
Elite Interests 
 
The concept of ‘elite interests’ refers to the dominant social forces who mediate, or 
who are implicated in, the process of neoliberal reproduction. It comprises two 
terminologies—elites and interests—that need to be identified and specified. Who are 
the elites, and what are their interests? 
 
Elites are individuals or groups of people who enjoy power and whose powers are 
derived from political position and/or economic wealth. The focus here is on these 
political-economic elites at domestic and international levels. The political elites 
pertain to incumbent government officials in the Philippines and Malaysia, as well as 
elites in the bureaucracy and the technocracy. And the economic elites include both 
local business interests and transnational corporations.  
 
Interests are stakes in the process of neoliberalization that are based on personal, 
political, economic, financial, ideological, class, familial, ethnic, or institutional 
considerations. Unlike some ideologies—such as neoliberalism, which is a set of 
established ideas—interests may be varied and oftentimes conflictive. 
 
In this paper, the concept ‘elite interests’ is understood as vested interests of 
political-economic elites at domestic and transnational levels. Since the process of 
neoliberalization is an evolving—rather than a fixed—regime of accumulation, elite 
interests are intrinsic to the formation of a particular configuration of political-
economic power relations and the shaping of capitalist development. 
 
Authoritarian Liberalism 
 
The concept of ‘authoritarian liberalism’ refers to an emergent social regime in 
Southeast Asia that has been a consequence of the social transformations in the 
evolution of capitalism in the region. In this paper, authoritarian liberalism is preferred 
to be caterogized as a ‘social regime’, which is a specific form or configuration of 
political-economic relations within the society, rather than as a ‘form of state’, which 
has strong political and governmental connotation. As John Holloway (1994) argues 
that to defetishize the notion of the state is necessary ‘to dissolve the state as a 
category…to understand the state not as a thing in itself, but as a social form, a form of 
social relations’ (p. 26).  
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Authoritarian liberalism is a social regime that combines a liberal market economy 
with political authoritarianism. In other words, it is a neoliberal economy embedded in 
an authoritarian political framework. The state form within this social regime is an 
‘authoritarian-liberal state’ that is oriented to the ideology and practices of political 
authoritarianism and economic liberalism.  
 
Towards a Critical Political Economy Approach to Southeast Asian Studies 
 
While each of the three key concepts—neoliberal reproduction, elite interests, and 
authoritarian liberalism—is specifiable independently to each other, they have to be 
brought together in a dynamic framework of interrelations to understand the specificity 
of the changing shape of capitalism in Southeast Asia. Based on the dialectical 
framework outlined above, it is argued that neoliberal reproduction in Southeast Asia is 
conflict-ridden whose process is mediated at the national level by conflicting elite 
interests and consequently engenders a contradictory social regime of increasing and 
deepening authoritarian liberalism in the Philippines and Malaysia, respectively.  
 
The framework and method of analysis outlined above allows for an understanding 
of the historical specificities and dynamics in Southeast Asia with emphasis on the 
dialectics between particular processes, interests, and form in contemporary capitalism 
in the Philippines and Malaysia. The critical theories and concepts introduced here 
understand the process of social change as both a reflection and a by-product of 
structure-agency contradiction. The analytical framework, within which these critical 
theories and concepts are constituted, enables an unraveling of capitalist dynamics in 
historical and comparative contexts by: firstly, examining the prevailing political-
economic structure (processes); secondly, relating the action of agency or actors in the 
evolution of this hegemonic social structure (interests); and thirdly, deciphering the 
emergent social regime in the enduring structure-agency interaction (form).  
 
 
NEOLIBERALIZATION2 
 
Neoliberal globalization emerged during the crisis of the 1970s and, since the end of 
the cold war, it has become the prevailing structure of the global political economy 
within which all societies, economies, and governments operate to varying degrees. 
Domestic political economies of Southeast Asia are deeply embedded within, whether 
locked-in or locked-out of, this wider global structure. The advent of this new phase in 
capitalist transformation ushered in the ascendancy of the idea of ‘neoliberalism’ as the 
new hegemonic development discourse and political-economic practice, supplanting 
the old Keynesian economic paradigm and the social democratic ethos in the advanced 
industrial economies, dismantling import-substitution industrialization experiments in 
Latin America, and challenging the Asian model of capitalist developmental states. But 
more than just an idea as a new configuration of liberal economics, neoliberalism is 
both a class project to secure the hegemony of capital over labour and a capitalist 
process involving new strategies for protecting and promoting the logics of 
accumulation and commodification. 
 
                                                
2 The empirical evidence of the theoretical and analytical claims made in this section are in Chapter II of 
my PhD thesis (see Juego forthcoming). 
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Over the years, the term neoliberalism has been interpreted in different ways by 
numerous scholars in the areas of political economy, geography, and sociology as, inter 
alia, a hegemonic ideology, a set of Washington and post-Washington Consensus 
policies, and a form of state and government (e.g., Larner 2000; Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 2001; Cammack 2003; Robison 2006a; Gamble 2006; Harvey 2007; Cerny 
2008; Saad-Filho and Yalman 2009). However, in order to grasp its complexity, as well 
as to capture its pervasiveness and contradictoriness, it is necessary to regard 
neoliberalism as a process, and hence ‘neoliberalization’ (Peck and Tickell 2002; 
Harvey 2005; Ward and England 2007). But while neoliberalization is understood as 
being ‘contradictory’, which also ‘tends to provoke counter-tendencies’ and that 
focuses on ‘change’ (Peck and Tickell 2002; Tickell and Peck 2003), it does not 
consider the process as merely contingent or a pure conjuncture. Rather, the process of 
neoliberalization is very much a process of the latest phase of capitalist development 
that is constitutive of a critical appreciation of history, political economy, causality, 
social relations, and structure (Wood 1986, 1995). 
 
Against the background of globalizing capitalism, societies in Southeast Asia 
develop at an uneven pace where pre-capitalist and advanced capitalist modes of 
production and exchange coexist across and within nations. While there are external 
historical-structural reasons for the unevenness of capitalist development in the region 
(see, e.g., Kunio 1988; Dixon 1991), intra-regional variations in terms of different 
domestic power relations give rise to distinct strategies for capital accumulation 
considering national differences in economic structure, political regimes, and cultural 
attributes. And while the neoliberal advance, especially during the pivotal decades of 
the 1970s and 1980s, engendered continuing class conflicts and contestations over 
power and resources, it also created new coalitions between capital and pro-capital 
political forces, both domestic and foreign, and hence sealing a particular nexus of 
businesses, states, and politics (McVey 1992a, 1992b; Jayasuriya 2003). In the 
Philippines, where the social structure of patronage still predominates domestic 
political and economic relations, new social forces consistent with the neoliberal 
restructuring agenda of the World Bank and the IMF have increasingly emerged since 
the fall of the authoritarian rule of Marcos in 1986 (Hutchison 2001; Bello 2000; 
Rivera 1994). In Malaysia, where social relations is not simply an issue of ethnicity but 
a profound class question, the dynamics of its domestic political economy and 
development future rest upon the balance of power between state, domestic capital, and 
foreign capital (Khoo 2001; Gomez 1990, 2002b; Jomo 1986, 1995). 
 
Though susceptible to capitalism’s systemic crises, neoliberal reforms has 
historically gathered and gained momentum during crisis moments. Neoliberalism was 
born out of the oil crisis and stagflation in the 1970s and has since evolved from crisis 
to crisis—from the debt crisis of the 1980s to the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 
2008 global economic crisis.  Thus, crises play a constitutive role in the reproduction of 
capitalism in general and of neoliberalism in particular. It is this process of the 
reproduction of neoliberalism—and, as such, the social relations and political-
economic dynamics that come with it—in the contexts of capitalist crises that 
characterizes contemporary Southeast Asia. 
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1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
 
The aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis has been pivotal in shaping 
contemporary political-economic structure in Southeast Asia. For many analysts, this 
crisis acted as a ‘catalyst’ for substantial economic restructuring and political 
contestations in the region (MacIntyre, Pempel, and Ravenhill 2008; see also Haggard 
2000; Robison, Beeson, Jayasuriya, and Kim 2000; Rodan, Hewison, and Robison 
2001). For hyperglobalists, the crisis signaled the end of ‘Asian exceptionalism’ (e.g., 
Fukuyama 1999) and thus provided the imperative for reforms and adjustment of 
economies that were fraught with corruptive and non-competitive ways of business 
(Haggard 2000; see also Pempel 1999). 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, the 1997 crisis and its aftermath are now seen as 
neoliberal globalization’s first major crisis that while it shook the emerging ascendancy 
of financial and economic liberalization, it also provided an opportune moment for 
neoliberal reformers to advance new macroeconomic policies and structural adjustment 
for the further institutionalization of an open market economy on a regional scale. 
These latter arrangements paved the way to the locking-in of East and Southeast Asian 
economies deeply into the disciplines required by the neoliberal orthodoxy, laying 
down the conditions to alter the so-called models of ‘late industrialization’ of state-
coordinated industrial policy and to expose the institutional debilities and anti-
competitive practices of ‘crony capitalism’. Neoliberal proponents from the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to local technocrats were upbeat about these 
crisis-induced reforms. Regional, interregional, and international organizations such as 
the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
functioned to hasten, reinforce, and complement processes of neoliberal reforms that 
were already under way at different national economies with the objective of locking 
these economies in to irreversible reform. Key instruments in their strategies are in the 
fields of social policy and labour market reform where the ideals of privatized welfare, 
deregulation of global finance, liberalization of trade, and the authority of capital over 
labour were reasserted to reinforce the logic of capitalist reproduction (Richards 2000). 
 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, the region was back to business-as-usual 
with market players and state actors actively engaged in accumulation. Yet, the rules of 
state-market relations in the region and in individual political economies have been 
thoroughly rewritten with neoliberalism as a new development orthodoxy. Central to 
these reforms was the governments’ adoption of the new public management 
framework where the old ideals of people-centered democracy through transparency 
and accountability had been reduced to the goals of efficiency by a kind of regulation 
to guarantee market competitiveness and foreign capital competition. 
 
2008 Global Economic Crisis and Southeast Asia 
 
The world capitalist system is currently under the conglomeration of interdependent 
and interrelated crises. It has become palpably evident that the recent catastrophe is a 
culmination of the cumulative effects of the simultaneous crises in finance, production, 
food, environment, energy, and governance that have been plaguing the world in the 
nearly four decades of neoliberalism. While crisis moments in capitalism have been 
viewed traditionally and conventionally as a conjunctural phase, rather than a 
fundamental structural contradiction, today actors from various ideological positions 
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perceive the situation as an opportune moment to advance their respective interests. 
 
A survey of the responses to the crisis coming from global governance institutions 
(the World Bank, IMF and the G-20), regional organizations (Asian Development Bank 
[ADB] and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]), and states (in East 
and Southeast Asia) manifests the unapologetic project for the perpetuation of 
neoliberal globalization (see Juego and Schmidt 2009). Take for example the crisis 
responses of regional organizations operating in the Asian region—the ADB and 
ASEAN. 
 
The ADB proactively responded to the fiscal needs of its developing member 
countries affected by the global crisis through ‘lending assistance’ amounting to USD 
32 billion for the period 2009-2010 (ADB 2009). As expected, it is banking-as-usual—
these are ‘loans’ extended to needy Asian countries to be paid from five to 15 years 
whose interest rates are determined by the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) 
either on a floating-rate or fixed-rate basis (ADB 2008). Typical of ADB’s agenda and 
priorities for the private sector, 44% of the loan are for programs to stimulate growth 
and restore private sector confidence; 35% for countercyclical support facility (a new 
short-term loan extended to middle-income member countries) for structural reforms 
toward an attractive investment climate; 12% for trade facilitation to support private 
sector development; but only 6% for infrastructure and a measly 3% for social 
protection (ADB 2009). Of course, the debtor governments (read: the people and the 
taxpayers) guarantee these loans, absorb all the risks, and are accountable even when 
the private sector fails and is responsible for the crisis. 
 
A month prior to the G-20 London Summit the was organized to respond to the 
global crisis, the ASEAN Heads of States/Governments had its 14th Summit in Cha-am 
Hua Hin, Thailand and had a caucus on 1 March 2009 to discuss the global economic 
and financial crisis and come up with their agenda which Indonesia, the only ASEAN 
member country of the G-20, is ought to convey to the G-20 leaders. What the caucus’ 
final statement declares are exactly of the same theme—even using the same words—
that the World Bank, IMF, and ADB spelt out in their respective responses to the 
global crisis. The ASEAN leaders: concurred [a] ‘to restore market confidence and 
ensure continued financial stability’; [b] ‘welcomed expansionary macroeconomic 
policies, including fiscal stimulus’ and ‘measures to support private sector, particularly 
SMEs’; [c] ‘stressed the importance of coordinating policies’; [d] ‘reaffirmed their 
determination to ensure the free flow of goods, services and investment, and facilitate 
movement of business persons, professionals, talents and labor, and freer flow of 
capital’; [d] ‘agreed to stand firm against protectionism and to refrain from introducing 
and raising new barriers’; [e] ‘agreed to intensify efforts to ensure a strong Doha 
Development Agenda outcome’; [f] ‘develop a more robust and effective surveillance 
mechanism’; [g] ‘welcomed the new Asian Bond Markets Initiative Roadmap’; [h] 
called for ‘more coordinated action by both developed and developing countries … to 
restore financial stability and ensure the continued functioning of financial markets to 
provide support to growth’; and [i] ‘called for a bold and urgent reform of the 
international financial system’ (ASEAN 2009c). This declaration is coherent with 
ASEAN’s commitment towards the ideals of free trade, competitiveness, and an open 
market economy being institutionalized over the last decade and will be pursued in the 
years to come. With the adoption of the ASEAN Charter at the end of 2008, ASEAN 
member countries have expressed their commitment to deepen Asian integration, 
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patterned after the rules-based European Union (EU), towards the creation of a single 
market and productive space by 2015 (see ASEAN 2009a; ASEAN 2009b). Rather 
than being cautious of the promises of free market under conditions of the current 
crisis, ASEAN has had sealed investment and trade agreements with countries in the 
Asia Pacific (Australia and New Zealand), East Asia (South Korea and China), and 
South Asia (India) almost every month from February to August 2009.  
 
The ASEAN 2015 Project Towards a Single Market 
 
The current responses of East and Southeast Asian states to the global crisis are bold 
and explicit that there is no backtracking on neoliberalism. The multi-billion dollar 
economic stimulus packages carried out by these countries as well as the multi-million 
loans they have received from the ADB are all directed and oriented towards economic 
growth recovery, private sector assistance, and an open market economy, and less on 
social protection for the poor (see ASEAN Affairs 2008; ADB 2009). Still, in a highly 
volatile political-economic situation there are risks that these billions of dollars can 
generate sharper budget deficits and even lead to another debt crisis. In fact, it is in the 
context of the three successive major economic crises in the last decade—the 1997 Asia 
crisis, the 2001 dot-com bubble collapse, and the 2008 Great Recession—that a daring 
project for a rules-based ASEAN single market by 2015 has been launched following 
the ratification of the ASEAN Charter on December 2008. Add to this, as already 
mentioned above, is a series of trade and investment agreements in the region that have 
been signed and adopted in the first half of 2009, namely: ASEAN free trade 
agreements with Australia and New Zealand, investment and trade in goods and 
services within ASEAN itself, ASEAN investment agreements with South Korea and 
China, and ASEAN trade in goods agreement with India. 
 
With the adoption of the ASEAN Charter and thereby the ASEAN Economic 
Community Blueprint, the 10 member countries have categorically committed 
themselves to the furtherance of free trade, competitiveness, and an open market 
economy; thus the perpetuation of a neoliberal order. All these commitments are 
expressed only on paper. The realpolitik is at the national level of individual member 
countries. The feasibility of this vision comes into conflict with the realpolitik of the 
nature of Asian elites—that is, it is their respective interests, not ideology, that matter 
at all times. Asian elites can be profoundly anti-market and counter-competitive so long 
as it serves their interests.  
 
The Philippines and Malaysia in Times of Crises 
 
By now, the respective political-economic responses of the Philippines and Malaysia 
on the 1997 AFC and the 2008 GEC have been documented. With hindsight, these 
crises have become functional, rather than dysfunctional, to the reproduction of the 
institutions, policies, and relations of neoliberalism. Neoliberal reformers have made 
these crises moments functional to the reproduction of market-oriented institutions and 
market-driven social relations—which entail both production itself and the conditions 
created for continued capital accumulation. The functionality of crises to neoliberalism 
is not a mere reflection of contingency, but a manifestation of history. This is 
particularly the case if one looked into the historical path of the political economy of 
reform undertaken in these economies since the 1970s. Hence, it is suggested that 
neoliberalization through a series of state restructuring projects and initiatives 
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associated with market reforms was already in train; but the crises contributed 
immensely to the acceleration of this process. 
 
An examination of the major development plans and policies of the Philippines and 
Malaysia points to the observation that the process of neoliberalization and its 
associated state restructuring programmes have been underway—particularly taking off 
in the 1980s for both countries. Specifically, in the Philippines, the important projects 
are the respective Medium-Term Philippine Development Plans (MTPDPs) and key 
reform initiatives of the administrations of Corazon Aquino (1986-1992), Fidel Ramos 
(1992-1998), Joseph Estrada (1998-2001), and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001-2010). 
And in Malaysia, it is instructive to notice the continuity of economic reform process 
from the twenty-year New Economic Policy (NEP) for the period 1971-1991, carried 
on through the leadership of Mahathir (1981-2003) and reaffirmed in his ‘Wawasan 
2020’ (Vision 2020) as enshrined in the New Development Policy (NDP) for 1991-
2020, and to the development projects of Abdullah Badawi (2003-2009) with his ‘Islam 
Hadhari’ (economic competitiveness within the framework of Islamic civilization) and 
the current Prime Minister Najib Razak with his ‘1Malaysia’ vision for global 
competitiveness. All these have been consistently enshrined in the series of 
development plans from the First Malaysia Plan (1MP) for 1966-1970 to the Tenth 
Malaysia Plan (10MP) for 2011-2015, as well as the First Outline Perspective Plan 
(OPP1, 1971-1990), Second Outline Perspective Plan (OPP2, 1991-2000), and the 
Third Outline Perspective Plan (OPP3, 2001-2010). 
 
The Asia crisis of 1997 had provided the opportunity for the thoroughgoing 
construction of a neoliberal regulatory regime in Southeast Asia, although variegated 
depending on historical and social dynamics in respective countries. For instance, one 
of the reasons why the Philippines has been more receptive than Malaysia to neoliberal 
external impositions (such as on austerity and further liberalization) was because of the 
former’s history of being tied and subjected to disciplinary SAPs by the World Bank 
and the IMF. Importantly, unlike Malaysia which got huge Japanese investments that 
boosted the economy’s industrialization project, the Philippines missed Japanese 
capital under the Plaza Accord due to the country’s political instability and a series of 
military coups in the late 1980s. But while Malaysia used capital controls and 
continued with a fixed exchange rate in response to the 1997 crisis, the country 
returned to business-as-usual immediately after the crisis, following a Keynesian rule 
that ‘the worse the situation, the less laissez-faire works’.  
 
Neoliberalization entails contradictory tendencies. One the one hand, it pushes 
economies to converge towards market-oriented institutions and policies as proven in 
the administrations of Cory Aquino, Fidel Ramos, Joseph Estrada, Gloria Arroyo, and  
Noynoy Aquino in the Philippines, and from the 1970 NEP through Mahathir’s NDP to 
the recent governments of Abdullah and Najib in Malaysia. On the other hand, it also 
comes with the reproduction of social antagonisms that spring from the accumulation 
strategy through dispossession strongly manifested in privatization projects such as the 
proliferation of public-private partnerships that effectively guarantees continued private 
accumulation by systematically depriving the people their rights, access, or ownership 
over previously held public properties (see Figure 2). As such, this process deepens 
hierarchies, inequalities, and resistances in the societies, polities, economies, and 
communities in the Philippines and Malaysia. 
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Figure 2: Crises and Neoliberalization in the Philippines and Malaysia 
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On the basis of this understanding of the contradictory internal logic of neoliberal 
reproduction, both the Philippines and Malaysia have similar drive to capital 
accumulation and hence undergo the social consequences related to this process. They 
differ however on the strategy for accumulation and on the intensity of its impact on 
social relations. 
 
The cases of the Philippines and Malaysia gives an account of capitalist diversity in 
which differences in national situations necessitate distinct projects of post-crises 
neoliberal restructuring from society to society in the region. The structural 
imperatives, relational character, and process of capitalist development have been the 
same since time immemorial. The difference comes not in structure, not in relations, 
not in the process, but in the strategy to pursue accumulation. One can therefore 
observe ‘neoliberalization the Philippine way’ and ‘neoliberalization the Malaysian 
way’. 
 
Due to the combined and uneven process of capitalist development in Southeast 
Asia, neoliberalization entails different strategies as it encounters varying interests 
among domestic elites from state to state in the region. In the particular contexts of the 
Philippines and Malaysia, the general neoliberal agenda for post-1997 crisis 
restructuring have taken varying configurations depending on the outcome of the 
struggle within the constellation of international and domestic forces.  
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The following section examines how and why neoliberal reproduction is a highly 
contested process mediated by conflicting interests among domestic and international 
elites. An understanding of this enduring struggle among different interests involved at 
domestic and international levels remains critical to have a clearer grasp of the nature 
of capitalist development in Southeast Asia in general and in the respective societies of 
the Philippines and Malaysia in particular. 
 
 
ELITES3 
 
With regard to the question of agency that drives the process of neoliberalization, 
domestic and international elites as dominant social forces mediate, negotiate, promote, 
or resist processes of neoliberal reproduction. A critical understanding of this dynamic 
requires an interrogation of ‘competitive capitalism’—which is a system and culture of 
competition where no particular faction of the capitalist class is feared or favoured in 
economic activities—as the ideal-type neoliberal reform, and a recognition of the 
realpolitik of conflicting elite vested interests in shaping capitalist development. 
Neoliberalization is not a seamless process completely dominated by global market 
forces. In reality, local elites with their political affinity to states within which capital 
ultimately settles and operates have the power and capacity to shape the process of 
neoliberalization. Recent controversies on reform initiatives and allegations of graft 
and corruption involving factions of domestic elites and transnational capital show the 
conflict-ridden constitution of capital accumulation in emerging economies of 
Southeast Asia.  
 
In the Philippines, most notable, if not notorious, cases include infrastructure 
projects that are part of the neoliberalization process, namely (see Figure 3):  
 
[i] NBN-ZTE (National Broadband Network project awarded to ZTE, a 
telecommunications supplier based in China), the most controversial 
deal entered into by the Arroyo administration;  
[ii] NAIA-3 (Ninoy Aquino International Airport Terminal 3), built by the 
Philippine International Airport Terminal Corporation (PIATCO), a 
joint venture of a Philippine group of Filipino-Chinese businesspeople 
and Germany Fraport AG amounting to USD 565-million; and  
[iii] Northrail (North Luzon Railways), one of China’s biggest aid projects 
in Southeast Asia funded by the Export-Import Bank of China through 
a USD 900-million soft loan.  
 
In Malaysia, some of the most controversial neoliberalization issues that showcase 
conflictive relations are (see Figure 4):  
 
[i] the resistance to privatize Petronas (Petroliam Nasional Berhad), an oil 
and gas company and the biggest government-linked company (GLC) 
in Malaysia and a de facto transnational corporation; 
[ii] Port Klang Free Zone (PKFZ), a multi-billion ringgit scandal; and 
                                                
3 The empirical discussion of the claims made in this section as well as a detailed discussion of the 
cases enumerated here are in Chapter III of my PhD thesis (see Juego forthcoming). 
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[iii] Water sector reforms, specially the struggles prior to the enactment of 
the Water Services Industry Act (WSIA) of 2006.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Cases in the Philippines 
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Figure 4: Cases in Malaysia 
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All these cases reveal various dimensions of conflicting elite relations in the 
process of neoliberalization in their scramble for capital accumulation. 
 
The process of neoliberal reform is confronted with the classic structure-agency 
contradiction as articulated in the pithy analysis of Marx (1852) on the dynamics of 
historical social change. To paraphrase Marx’s polemics, it can be said that: Neoliberal 
reformers attempt to ‘make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; 
they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing 
already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations 
weighs like a nightmare on the brains of (the living neoliberals)’. At the heart of the 
process of neoliberal restructuring in Southeast Asia are domestic elites with political-
economic vested interests in accumulation who wield significantly the shape of 
capitalist development in the region. 
 
Both the Philippines and Malaysia embody substantive features of ‘crony 
capitalism’ and ‘state capitalism’ that are antithetical to neoliberalism’s form and 
practice of ‘competitive capitalism’. These political-economic regimes are therefore the 
ideal targets of neoliberal reform. It was hoped that the crisis of 1997 would be a 
turning point or a ‘catalyst’ for the convergence of these Southeast Asian economies 
towards a market-led development model (MacIntyre, Pempel, and Ravenhill 2008). 
But the prevailing structures and relations in the region make such reform projects all 
the more conflictive. In principle, the Philippines and Malaysia have acceded to the 
normative ideas of free market and competitiveness as evidenced in their respective 
economic restructuring policy measures. In reality, however, the fate of these neoliberal 
market reform ideas is, to a large extent, contingent upon the interests of domestic 
elites, not least incumbent political elites. In this sense, it is interests—rather than 
ideas—that mostly determine the shape of capitalist development in the region. Elites 
in Southeast Asia can be downright anti-neoliberalism or counter-competitiveness so 
long as it serves their interests. The proclaimed neoliberal ideology of these elites ends 
when their vested interests begin. 
 
Neoliberalism regards the market—specifically, the private sector—as the means 
and ends of economic development. Market rationality in the policies of privatization, 
deregulation, and liberalization is said to be the logic of a truly competitive capitalism. 
It is assumed that if state’s role is limited only to facilitating the conduct of private 
business, instances of corruption will largely be reduced. And so the neoliberal slogan 
goes: less state intervention, less corruption. However, the concrete cases of Southeast 
Asia undergoing the process of neoliberalization offer a prospectus different from the 
neoliberal ideology. While the policies of privatization, deregulation, and liberalization 
enlarge the territory for private capital accumulation, they have also opened a large 
pool of opportunities through which incumbent domestic (political) elites can swim on 
new channels for corruption and rent-seeking activities. With the opening up of 
Southeast Asia to the world market, incumbent state functionaries have discovered 
ways to receive bribes and other forms of rents from transnational capital. 
Transnational elites such as transnational corporations have included in their business 
accumulation strategies and their accounts the transaction costs of dealing with 
domestic political elites in developing countries (see, e.g., Moody-Stuart 1997). 
Economic liberalization has in fact not led to the reduction of corruption in the 
developing world (Harriss-White and White 1996; Schmidt 2002). Corruption, or what 
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Marx then called ‘primitive accumulation’, has always been embedded in the process of 
capitalist development. 
 
What is intriguing that might implicate transnational capital and state functionaries 
in illegitimate accumulation is the huge amount of illicit flows in Asia at the beginning 
of the 21st century. For the period 2000-2008, the Global Financial Integrity (2011) has 
come up with cumulative figures of USD 291 billion for Malaysia and USD 109 billion 
for the Philippines, making both countries in the top three with the largest portion of 
illicit flows in the world.4 One begs to ask the question about the timing, volume, and 
movement of these transfers. The neoliberal rules that encourage capital flight through 
the deepening of financial liberalization policies of easy entry and exit especially 
during the post-1997 AFC period make these transfers possible. The sheer volume and 
the outward movement of these flows are telling of the involvement of transnational 
corporations, who might have mobilized their contacts within the state to evade taxes 
and other laws and the usual red tape. 
 
In recent years, new institutional economics has assumed prominence and has been 
integrated into the vision of the neoliberal ideology to create ‘competition cultures’ 
across the global economy. This new configuration of neoliberalism has been referred 
to as ‘socio-institutional neoliberalism’ or SIN (Carroll 2010). Since the goal of 
institutions is to reduce transaction costs so as to provide incentives for productivity-
enhancing behaviour, institutions are seen to offset institutionalized corruption in 
developing countries in Southeast Asia. It is hoped that institutions can provide the 
‘rules of the game’—a substantial degree of predictability on the behaviour of 
economic agents and of regularity on the conduct of human interaction for growth and 
productivity in the long-run (North 1990; Greif 2006). This economic philosophy of the 
institutionalists, however, is very normative. In reality, amidst the phase of 
liberalization and economic reform in the Philippines and Malaysia, the 
institutionalized character of patronage and rent-seeking in these states make even 
international private capital play by the rules of the game through bribery and other 
palm-greasing acts. This therefore makes transnational capital both complicit and 
participant in the illicit practices of graft and corruption, which are political-economic 
activities that go against the tenets of competitiveness. 
 
Neoliberalization has also brought in a process of restructuring of relations of 
conflict and collaboration between transnational and national elites. At some point, 
both groups collaborate on projects they deem to be mutually beneficial to their shared 
interests. At another point, both have conflicts over policies which contradict their 
respective interests for power and resources. 
 
It has been assumed that the reproduction of neoliberalism through macroeconomic 
policies of privatization, liberalization, and deregulation would entail the destruction of 
state monopoly in economic activities and the subsequent introduction of a culture of 
competition in the supply market. On the contrary, neoliberalism has even enlarged the 
pool of prospective clients from whom entrenched elites may appropriate rents, and of 
                                                
4 Global Financial Integrity (2011) reports that: ‘Asia continues to produce the largest portion of illicit 
flows, almost a half-trillion dollars in 2008 alone. Across the nine years from 2000 to 2008, selected 
cumulative figures are: China – US$2.2 trillion; Malaysia – US$291 billion; Philippines – US$109 
billion; and Indonesia and India – both US$104 billion’ (p. i). 
 
 18 
course, this increases the cost of doing business for foreign investors. The respective 
development experiences of the Philippines and Malaysia show that these neoliberal 
policies have not succeeded in creating a competitive regime. Instead of subjecting 
elites to disciplinary neoliberalism, elites themselves have appropriated neoliberal 
reproduction to their political-economic interests. 
 
While classical political economy of Adam Smith claims the existence of harmony 
between classes, ‘the isolated individual of liberalism is parodied since private interest 
is itself already a socially determined interest and the symmetrical exchange relation is 
shown to conceal exploitation’ (Burnham 1994: 224). The detachment of political-
economic theory from its social context has the effect of occluding an understanding of 
a very wide range of social conflict. 
 
The normative constitution of the whole tradition of liberalism, in which the 
political-economic ideology of neoliberalism is founded on, takes for granted a range 
of concrete social conditions and relations that limit freedom of action (Skinner 2008; 
Wood 2008). Neoliberalism has always been peddled as a universalizing ideology of 
freedom and liberty of markets. Such ‘marketing’, however, seems to be insensitive to 
the many conditions that interfere with the reproduction of market relations. In reality, 
neoliberalism does not enjoy liberty—which is understood as the absence of 
dependence—especially at the domestic level in the context of Southeast Asian states 
like the Philippines and Malaysia whose economic activities firmly rest on political 
actions. Existing social dynamics of elite rule limits freedom of markets. And 
variegations of neoliberalism largely depend on the dynamics of elite interests. The 
arbitrary political power exercised by these elites greatly contradicts the requirements 
of neoliberalism for regularity, rationality, and rule of law. The politically-charged 
interference on economic policy implementation of these elites based on their vested 
interests strips off the market of its assumed supremacy and reduce it to the servitude of 
the elites. 
 
Presumably, free markets exist in free states. Both the Philippine and Malaysian 
states are not ‘free’ from particular class interests; they are very much captive by their 
respective political elites, who in turn shape domestic market relations. 
 
The idea of ‘market sovereignty’ is not absolute; it is very much normative. Its 
realization would derive from voluntary and unconditional submission of its subjects. 
Well-entrenched elites in the Philippines and Malaysia have established themselves 
into a first mover advantage position, and as such they would raise the barriers to entry 
for international capital that might compete with their interests. In this sense, old 
domestic elites can impede capitalism’s motion and can also obstruct capitalist 
reproduction. 
 
The process of neoliberal reproduction—understood here as founded on the idea of 
‘competitive capitalism’ that promotes a competition culture—comes into conflict with 
well-entrenched elite interests. Unlike ideology, such as neoliberalism, which is a set of 
established ideas, interests are varied. The normative prescription for ‘competitiveness’ 
in which there is no particular faction of capital that is feared or favoured confronts 
head-on the realpolitik of vested interests. 
 
Moments of crises have further revealed the contradictions in the system of 
 19 
neoliberalism; but, at the same time, it has manifested the consistency of the self-
interested nature of the elites. While neoliberalism needs a stable financial system with 
integrity, the economic crises of 1997 and 2008 were due to greed, irrational 
exuberance, and selfish individualism of financial elites that venture into speculative 
activities which resulted in chronic volatility and instability of the system. And while 
neoliberalism requires the virtues of competition, the crises have reinforced the logic of 
elite interests for the consolidation of monopoly power.  
 
Political-economic elite interests in the Philippines and political-business alliances 
with class and ethnic vested interests in Malaysia shape neoliberal reproduction in the 
region to a large extent. Far from being the ideal-typical Weberian bureaucratic polity 
with embedded autonomy, economic elites in the Philippine and Malaysian 
plutocracies have political leverage in state apparatus. The graft and corruption 
scandals plaguing both the Philippines and Malaysia provide the concrete empirical 
evidence to prove these contradictory tendencies. For Southeast Asian elites, their 
proclaimed neoliberal ideology ends when their vested interests begin. In the long-run, 
it is domestic elite interests that is the greatest challenge or obstacle to neoliberal 
reproduction. 
 
A central agenda here is to highlight the question of agency as it interacts with 
capitalist development. In doing so, it has shown the structure-agency dynamics in the 
historical process of social change. It makes an argument that the process of neoliberal 
reproduction is intrinsically constrained by its dependence on elite interests. It also 
suggests the impediments that stand in the way of neoliberalization. Hence, the process 
is to be understood vis-à-vis the social and material conditions in which it is deployed. 
 
 
AUTHORITARIAN LIBERALISM5 
 
A particular social regime in the Philippines and Malaysia is emerging as a 
consequence of contemporary dynamics of capitalism in Southeast Asia. The process 
of neoliberal reproduction comes into conflict with vested interests of political-
economic elites and what comes out amidst this conflict is another seemingly 
contradictory form, a social regime of ‘authoritarian liberalism’.  
 
This is manifested in the political projects and attempts at embedding authoritarian 
liberalism in Southeast Asia—in particular, its institutionalization in the Philippines 
and its deepening in Malaysia. In the case of the Philippines, the focus is on the project 
of the Arroyo administration (2001-2010) to configure new institutions that are more 
likely to secure the conditions for elite and capitalist reproduction in the country within 
the framework of a neoliberal ‘strong republic’. And in the case of Malaysia, it is 
suggested that the respective visions and strategies of succeeding governments—
namely, ‘Vision 2020’ of Mahathir, ‘Islam Hadhari’ of Abdullah, and ‘1Malaysia’ of 
Najib—are all oriented towards the deepening of a neoliberal economy within the 
discipline of political authoritarianism (see Figure 5). 
 
 
 
                                                
5 The empirical discussion of this section is in Chapter IV of my PhD thesis (see Juego forthcoming). 
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Figure 5: Forging ‘Authoritarian Liberalism’ in the Philippines and Malaysia 
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The concept of ‘authoritarian liberalism’ is not new; it has had its long established 
philosophical influences and theoretical underpinnings. Its idea and philosophy has 
been well-articulated in the ‘strong state, free economy’ formulation of the German 
jurist Carl Schmitt during the Second World War; the ‘Kirkpatrick Doctrine’ during the 
Cold War and the Vietnam War; and the World Bank’s neoliberal idea of an ‘effective 
state’ for the capitalist market in the mid-1990s. 
 
As a consequence of the conflicting tendencies between the process of neoliberal 
reproduction and the realpolitik of elite interests, a seemingly contradictory social 
regime called ‘authoritarian liberalism’ is emerging in Southeast Asia. This social 
regime constitutes a neoliberal economy embedded in an authoritarian polity. The state 
form in this regime may be called an ‘authoritarian-liberal state’, whose political 
orientation is authoritarian and whose economic philosophy is liberal. 
 
The idea of authoritarian liberalism in the current formulation is conceptually 
different—chiefly in terms of analytical orientation—from the one earlier introduced 
and developed by Kanishka Jayasuriya (2000, 2001, 2005) in the literature on Asian 
political economy. For Jayasuriya, authoritarian liberalism is the emergent 
‘authoritarian mode of liberalism’ that has replaced the postwar mode of international 
governance, which John Ruggie (1982) then called as ‘embedded liberalism’.6 
                                                
6 For Ruggie (1982: 393), ‘the essence of the embedded liberalism compromise’ was that ‘unlike the 
economic nationalism of the thirties, it would be multilateral in character; unlike the liberalism of the 
gold standard and free trade, its multilateralism would be predicated upon domestic interventionism.’ 
Hence, central to embedded liberalism was the institutional nexus between multilateralism and domestic 
stability (i.e., greater openness to international economy is supported by cushioning the domestic 
economy from external disruptions) and within this framework the state plays a mediating role between 
market and society.   
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Jayasuriya (2000, 2001, 2005) argues that the authoritarian liberal order embodies a 
new form of ‘anti politics’ that has enabled the formation of a strong ‘regulatory state’ 
whose main purpose is to regulate and insulate the liberal market economy from 
politics. Like the normative framework of Ruggie’s concept of embedded liberalism, 
Jayasuriya’s take on authoritarian liberalism is built on a ‘normative foundation’. In 
contrast to Jayasuriya’s normative orientation, the concept of authoritarian liberalism in 
this paper is a structural reading of the reality of political-economic relations in 
contemporary Southeast Asia. 
 
Capitalism can function even without political democracy. Since every capitalist 
firm is unique (Penrose 1995 [1959]), the choice of investment site depends on a 
particular firm’s business calculations. From the perspective of capital, big investment 
decisions are based on rational analyses of risks, possibilities, opportunities, costs and 
benefits. A regime of authoritarian liberalism does not guarantee profitability. Capital 
may opt to settle in an economy with more open political system and a more liberal 
labour regime. 
 
However, the interests of elites in the process of neoliberalization are not 
antithetical to authoritarian liberalism. In fact, these tendencies can be mutually 
reinforcing. Neoliberalism, after all, was an elite project launched in the 1980s to 
restore economic and political power of the elites and capitalists and whose unequal 
disposition of power has profound effects on the enjoyment of civil and political 
liberties and social and economic rights (Harvey 2005).  
 
Authoritarian liberalism as a social regime is a manifestation of a structural 
contradiction in neoliberalization. Authoritarianism is contrary to the proclaimed ideals 
of capitalism for individual freedoms. But, at the same time, authoritarianism is 
embedded in an elitist class relations whose reproduction is fundamental to capitalism. 
 
The ‘authoritarian-liberal state’ is a particular articulation of the prevailing 
orientation of the government on the polity and the economy. As such, it does not deny 
the fact that states are sites of contestation and coalition; in particular, they are arenas 
for social struggle and alliance formation among factions of the capitalist class 
themselves and between political-economic elites and other social groups and actors 
who seek to advance their respective interests. 
 
The fundamental mission of an authoritarian-liberal state is twofold: create an 
‘attractive business climate’ through market-oriented institutions and ensure elite 
dominance through market-driven class relations. For the liberal economy, the idea is 
to optimize conditions for capital accumulation; and for the authoritarian polity, the 
goal is to maintain the hegemony of elites at all means. 
 
The ‘authoritarian-liberal state’ promotes economic neoliberalism by making all 
state resources oriented towards the protection of business interests through 
institutions, tax breaks, concessions, and other guarantee provisions. It is obsessed with 
growth and sees the private sector as the foremost engine of development. It is for the 
privatization of assets to enlarge the space for capital accumulation. It is for de-
regulation or re-regulation not so much for the common good but to ensure market 
sovereignty. It is for liberalization for the free mobility of capital that can easily enter 
and exit the country. It is for ‘flexibility’ in labour markets in which rules are flexible 
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for the market but a source of insecurity for labour. It proclaims competition while 
tolerant of oligopoly and monopoly power. It regards competitiveness as race-to-the-
bottom as a competitive advantage through low wages and poor labour conditions. In 
times of crises, the facilitative role of states has been complemented with 
interventionist actions in mediating or resolving crises and its tendencies through fiscal 
and monetary policies as well as social policies geared at maintaining stability and the 
need for political legitimacy. 
 
At the same time, the ‘authoritarian-liberal state’ is essentially anti-democratic as 
its governance system is more responsive to elites and market forces than to popular-
democratic forces. It is characterized by the dominance of the executive whose 
preferred legislation is the issuance of executive orders that bypasses the democratic 
requirements for parliamentary or congressional decision-making. It is the most potent 
coercive apparatus for the perpetuation of the strategy of accumulation by 
dispossession. 
 
In the final analysis, Malaysia is best understood as an authoritarian-liberal state, 
not a ‘developmental state’; and that the Philippines has growing features of 
authoritarian liberalism, rather than simply a ‘predatory regime’. It is the emergence of 
the social regime of authoritarian liberalism that has been one of the most distinctive 
characteristics of the political economy of Southeast Asia. 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS7 
 
Southeast Asian regional dynamic suggests that the region is constantly engaged in the 
process of change, which is largely determined by the enduring tension between 
structure and agency. Contemporary specificities of capitalism in the region is 
characterized by the contradictory processes of neoliberalization (i.e., the reproduction 
of market-oriented social institutions and the strategy of accumulation by 
dispossession) that are carved out by political-economic contestations of transnational 
and local elites and their scramble for capital accumulation. What is emergent in this 
prevailing structural-agential interactions is a conflictive authoritarian-liberal social 
regime in which a liberal market economy is embedded in a political framework of 
authoritarianism. Thus, a dynamic analysis of processes, interests, and transformations 
is needed in order to grasp the complexity of the evolving capitalist structural relations 
in the first decade of 21st century Southeast Asia. 
 
The paper has attempted to outline a contribution to a critical appraisal of the 
contemporary political economy of Southeast Asia—based upon comparison of two 
diverse societies between the Philippines and Malaysia, and rooted in a dialectical 
relationship between the three concepts: neoliberal reproduction, elite interests, and 
authoritarian liberalism. It has provided an analytical and conceptual framework as well 
as an interpretation of the historical specificities of capitalist development through a 
systematic analysis of a conflictual process (neoliberal reproduction) mediated by 
conflicting interests (elite interests) and producing a conflict-ridden form 
(authoritarian liberalism). 
                                                
7 A more elaborate synthesis of the findings and key arguments is in the Concluding Chapter of my PhD 
thesis (see Juego forthcoming). 
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The paper may have fallen short of spelling out the modalities or strategies of 
opposition to the hegemonic capitalist structure. But with the analysis offered here of 
the contemporary shape of capitalism and its tendencies points the way to which 
struggle for alternative futures may be mounted. 
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